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ABSTRACT

This thesis is a case study in how weak campaign finance laws and government
oversight can undermine democracy in a local election. It does so by demonstrating
how Louisiana campaign finance law enabled one wealthy businessman to play a major
role in a mayoral election under the auspices of an issue-based political action
committee. Through the examination of the Louisiana PAC BRNext, its financial
activities, and its relationships, this study suggests that BRNext and its founder Lane
Grigsby were able to violate the spirit of the law in each of these areas. BRNext was able
to take advantage of the loophole-ridden and vague Louisiana campaign finance law,
opening the electoral process up to the possibility for corruption. After discussing how
this mayoral election illustrates the failure of Louisiana’s legal frameworks to achieve
core goals of campaign finance law, this study makes suggestions for adapting policy
by taking into account new political actors and new routes for spending.
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INTRODUCTION

The 2004 Baton Rouge mayoral race was entrenched in controversy across party
and racial lines. Following the primary, Melvin ‚Kip‛ Holden (D), an AfricanAmerican, and Bobby Simpson (R), the white incumbent mayor in a predominantly
black city, faced each other in a runoff, a rematch of the 2000 mayoral election. This
time, however, the local political action committee (PAC) BRNext was in Holden’s
corner. On election day, in a landmark victory, Holden won with more than 55 percent
of the vote, a jump up from the 43 percent he received in 2000.1 And in unseating
Simpson, Holden became the first African-American mayor of Baton Rouge.
What changed from the 2000 election? Researchers, journalists, and even the
defeated Simpson all credited BRNext with making the difference. BRNext appeared
after the general election, broadcasting a series of television advertisements and
presenting itself as an issue-based group and a community coalition for change. Many
of its initial advertisements supported this claim, focusing on general issues like crime
and traffic. Closer to the run-off, however, the PAC began airing attack ads against
Simpson. During and following the election, many people behind the scenes questioned
the legitimacy of BRNext, its sources of funding, and its intentions. 2 A closer look at
BRNext suggests that, rather than operating as a grassroots organization comprised of
community members, it was actually a campaign waged and bankrolled by one man,

1

Scott Dyer, Clean Campaign Vowed BRNext to Continue Ad Plan, THE ADVOCATE, September 20, 2004.
Interview with George Kennedy, Media Consultant, BRNext, in Baton Rouge, La. (April 22, 2005).
Kennedy said, ‚Yeah, people were suspicious of BRNext. Louisiana blogs buzzed about Grigsby and who
else was behind the group.‛
2
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Lane Grigsby, and his corporations—corporations whose business interests were
affected considerably by those in office.
Did this landmark election reflect an open, fair, and equitable democracy at work
or was it a reflection of money’s corrupting power in politics? Was Grigsby exercising
his right to free speech or was he using his corporate wealth to dominate the political
discourse in the 2004 mayor’s race? Evidence suggests the latter.
To determine whether money has a corrupting influence on politics and whether
campaign finance laws are beneficial, scholars have conducted broad quantitative
studies.3 These studies focus primarily on the use of money in congressional elections, 4
voter turnout in relation to campaign spending,5 and public funding of electoral
campaigns.6 In terms of qualitative analysis there is no shortage of anecdotal case
studies, however, there are very few qualitative case studies in terms of systematic
academic studies.7 Such case studies offer an opportunity for in-depth examination of

DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN
AMERICA (1975); Ruth Jones, State Public Campaign Finance: Implications for Partisan Politics, 25 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 342 (1981); Karen J. Fling, The State as Laboratories of Reform. In POLITICAL
FINANCE 245(Herbert E. Alexander ed., 1979); Ruth S. Jones, Financing State Elections, in MONEY AND
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 172 (Michael J. Malbin ed., 1984); David C. Nice, Political Equality and
Campaign Finance in the American States, 65 SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 183 (1984).
4
Karen J. Fling, The State as Laboratories of Reform. In POLITICAL FINANCE 245(Herbert E. Alexander ed., 1979);
Ruth S. Jones, Financing State Elections, in MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 172 (Michael J. Malbin
ed., 1984); David C. Nice, Political Equality and Campaign Finance in the American States, 65 SOCIAL SCIENCE
QUARTERLY 183 (1984). GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980); Stanton A. Glantz,
Alan I. Abramowitz, & Michael P. Burkart, Election Outcomes: Whose Money Matters?, 38 JOURNAL OF POLITICS
1033 (1976).
5
Samuel C. Patterson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Getting out the vote: participation in Gubernatorial Elections, 77
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 675 (1983).
6
DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY: A STRATEGY FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN
AMERICA (1975); Ruth Jones, State Public Campaign Finance: Implications for Partisan Politics, 25 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 342 (1981).
7 Robert J. Huckshorn, Who Gave it? Who Got It?: The Enforcement of Campaign Finance Laws in the States, 47
JOURNAL OF POLITICS 773 (1985); GARY C. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS (1980); Stanton
3
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the competing constitutional interests of political speech and the political integrity of
the electoral process. Political speech as a First Amendment right has been examined in
terms of federal law quite a bit.8 Little has been done in terms of examining this speech
on the state level, and even less has been done on the local level.9 This study looks at the
financial hijacking of the 2004 Baton Rouge mayoral race under current Louisiana
campaign finance law. The purpose of this study is to address the appearance of
corruption on the state and local level, and suggest that this advances the current
argument for campaign finance reform. It does so through analysis of state and federal
law; examination of campaign finance records; and in-depth interviews with BRNext
founder Lane Grigsby, media consultant George Kennedy, fundraiser Chris Hicks, and
former Deputy General Counsel of the Louisiana Ethics Board Maris Leblanc.
Chapter 1 discusses the current debate surrounding campaign finance reform
and pertinent court rulings, and explains the direction of this study. Chapter 2 defines
key terminology, gives a brief history of campaign finance reform, and explains current

A. Glantz, Alan I. Abramowitz, & Michael P. Burkart, Election Outcomes: Whose Money Matters?, 38
JOURNAL OF POLITICS 1033 (1976).
8 William F. Buckley, Jr., About Nikpak, NATIONAL REVIEW (May 15, 1981); Charles T. McConville,
Muzzling the Mouthless Speaker: The Reform Community’s Prescription for “Corporate Domination” in State
Issue Campaigns, 35 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 245 (2006); Lillian R. BeVier, Money and Politics: A
Perspective on the First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform, 69 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1045 (July,
1985); Andrew Stark, Strange Bedfellows: Two Paradoxes in Constitutional Discourse Over Corporate and
Individual Political Activity, 14 CARDOZA LAW REVIEW 1343 (April, 1993).
9 Margery M. Ambrosius, The Role of Occupational Interest Groups in State Economic Development PolicyMaking, 42 WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY 53 (1989); VIRGINIA GRAY & DAVID LOWERY, THE POLITICAL
ECOLOGY OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION: LOBBYING COMMUNITIES IN THE AMERICAN STATES (1996); RONALD
J. HERBENAR & CLIVE S. THOMAS, INTEREST GROUP POLITICS IN THE SOUTHERN STATES (1992); Kenneth G.
Hunter, Laura Ann Wilson & Gregory Brunk, Societal Complexity and Interest Group Lobbying in the
American States, 53 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 488 (1991); ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE THIRD HOUSE: LOBBYISTS AND
LOBBYING IN THE STATES (2001).
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Louisiana campaign finance law. Chapter 3 gives a detailed account of BRNext’s role in
the 2004 mayoral race. Chapter 4 outlines key research findings, discusses their
implications for democracy, and makes suggestions for campaign finance policy reform.
Finally, Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of the impact that cases like BRNext have
on democracy and the importance of additional reform.
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TWO COMPETING CONSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS

Free Speech v. Political Integrity of the Electoral Process
The introduction of campaign finance law incited the battle between two
competing constitutional interests: freedom of speech and the preservation of a healthy
democracy. Since the Tillman Act of 190710 attempted to curtail corporate capital’s
influence on politics, Congress, the Supreme Court, and state legislatures have debated
whether spending money in a campaign is political speech that should be protected or
whether it corrupts the political process by allowing those with wealth to unfairly
influence elections and, ultimately, government policy. On one side, there are those
who argue that campaign finance restrictions, such as bans on corporate contributions,
are a violation of the First Amendment right to free speech.11 On the other side, those in
favor of greater restriction seek to protect the political integrity of the electoral process
from what they believe to be the corrupting influence of money.
Those against additional campaign finance restrictions argue that because money
is a means to participate in political speech, campaign contributions and expenditures
are entitled to constitutional protection under the First Amendment.12 The notion of
money as speech by proxy can be traced back to the Supreme Court’s 1976 landmark

Tillman Act of 1907, 34 Stat. 864.
J. Tobin Grant & Thomas J. Rudolph, Value Conflict, Group Affect, and the Issue of Campaign Finance, 47
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 453 (July 2003).
12
Mitch McConnell, In Defense of Soft Money, NEW YORK TIMES, April 1, 2001; Bradley A. Smith, Money
Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance, 86 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 45 (1997); Bradley
A. Smith, Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition of a Soft Money Ban, 179 JOURNAL OF
LEGISLATION 179 (1998); Bradley A. Smith, The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First
Amendment, 6 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 1 (1999); BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2001).
10
11
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decision in Buckley v. Valeo, in which the court struck down FECA’s limits on campaign
expenditures. The Court asserted that ‚*a+ restriction on the amount of money a person
or group can spend on political communication during a campaign necessarily reduces
the quantity of expression<because virtually every means of communicating ideas in
today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.‛13 Along the same sentiment,
the ACLU deemed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, a law that was
designed to close existing contribution loopholes, as ‚a recipe for political repression
because it egregiously violates longstanding free speech rights...‛14 And when the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the key provisions of BCRA, Justice Antonin Scalia declared it "a
sad day for freedom of speech" in his dissenting opinion, and added: "Who could have
imagined the court would smile with favor upon a law that cuts to the heart of what the
First Amendment is meant to protect: The right to criticize the government."15
Advocates of more stringent campaign finance regulation posit two primary
arguments: The first is that the undue influence of money undermines political equality
by allowing the wealthy to dominate political debate and creates a situation that can
foster quid pro quo political corruption. Second, these advocates argue that this
undermining of political debate and political integrity, creates an atmosphere of public
cynicism and voter apathy.16 In Checkbook Democracy: How Money Corrupts Political

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976).
Laura Murphy & Joel Gora, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD S3135, March 29, 2001.
15
McConnell v. Federal Election Com’n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). In dissenting opinion.
16
DAVID W. ADAMANY & GEORGE E. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY (1975); OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE
SPEECH (1996); Edward Foley, Equal-Dollars-per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1204 (1994); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An
Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 1 (1996),
13
14
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Campaigns, Darrell West argues that due to a rise in independent expenditures, election
costs, issue advocacy, and candidates’ dependence on third-parties, elections no longer
stimulate debate over ideas and policies, but instead, have degenerated into contests in
which candidates try to raise more and more money.17 The overall argument here is that
if a minority of wealthy individuals dominates the political discourse, that discourse
will only reflect the interests of that elite group.

In addition to stifling debate, proponents of stringent campaign finance law
argue that economic inequalities pose a serious threat to political egalitarianism by
giving big corporations and wealthy individuals a disproportionate share of influence
in politics.18 These reform proponents argue that campaign contributions often translate
into access to politicians or legislative action.19 Jamin Raskin, Associate Professor of Law
at The American University, summed up this argument when he said, ‚Political
corruption in America today does not consist simply of quid pro quo relationships

Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1627
(1999); Burt Neuborne, Is Money Different?, 77 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1609 (1999),Burt Neuborne, Toward a
Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1055
(1999); Jamin Raskin & Jon Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE LAW AND POLICY
REVIEW 273 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94 COLUMBIA LAW
REVIEW 1390 (1994); Fred Wertheimer & Susan Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the
Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1126 (1994); DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK
DEMOCRACY: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS (2000).
17
DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK DEMOCRACY: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS (2000).
18
OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996); Edward Foley, Equal-Dollars-per-Voter: A Constitutional
Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1204 (1994); Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons
for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers, 84 CALIFORNIA LAW
REVIEW 1 (1996); Richard L. Hasen, Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem, 77 TEXAS LAW
REVIEW 1627 (1999); Burt Neuborne, Is Money Different?, 77 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 1609 (1999); Burt
Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW 1055 (1999); Jamin Raskin & Jon Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealthy Primary, 11 YALE
LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 273 (1993); Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequences, 94
COLUMBIA REVIEW 1390 (1994); Fred Wertheimer & Susan Manes, Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to
Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1126 (1994).
19
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) at 26-27.
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between special interests and elected officials. It involves a massive structural bias in
government favoring the parochial interests of corporate and personal wealth over the
interests of those citizens lacking access to such wealth.‛20 He argues that economic
elites hide behind the First Amendment as a way to ensure their freedom to continue
buying elections.21
As a result of such corruption, these reform proponents argue that the general
public has given up on the integrity of the system. They contend that this has translated
into lower turnout rates and less overall political participation. Former Congressman
Lee Hamilton, director of the Center on Congress at Indiana University, echoed this
sentiment when he said, ‚The rising flood of money that flows into campaigns also
undermines general public trust in the political system. Many Americans feel it is
money, not ideas and not principles, that reigns supreme in our political system. I often
heard people say that the political process was run by moneyed interests, so they saw
little reason to vote.‛22
The Courts’ Debate
While the Supreme Court deems political speech at the core of the First
Amendment, it too has been torn over the question of whether money, corporate or
otherwise, equals protected speech. There are two outlooks reflected in the Court’s

Jamin Raskin, Associate Professor of Law at The American University, Letter to the BOSTON REVIEW
(1993), http://bostonreview.net/BR18.3/forum.html. Commenting on Ellen Miller’s Money, Politics and
Democracy.
21
Id.
22
Lee Hamilton, The Money Chase, The Center on Congress at Indiana University, October 3, 2005,
http://congress.indiana.edu/radio commentaries/the money chase.php
20
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decisions: that political speech should be protected at any cost and that some speech must
be restricted to maintain and/or restore the integrity of the electoral process.
Throughout the 70s and early 80s, Court decisions emphasized the importance of
the citizen’s right to receive information in the marketplace of ideas, regardless of
whether that information, or speech, comes from individuals or corporations. In Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,23 the Court reasoned that
‚speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project
it, as in a paid advertisement<‛24 The Court later reasoned that the free flow of
information through advertising serves the First Amendment goal of enlightening public
decision-making in a democratic society.25 This is in line with Justice Brennan’s 1965
argument that the best way to ascertain the truth is to have ‚uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open‛ discussion, as in a ‚free marketplace of ideas.‛26
Two years after the Virginia ruling, the Court went beyond the protection of
advertisements as a means to market products and specifically addressed the right of
corporations to participate in political discourse. In First National Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti,27 the Court ruled that corporate ‚speech *is+ indispensable to decision-making in a
democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather
than an individual.‛28 The Court reaffirmed this decision in Citizens Against Rent Control

Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Id. at 762.
25
Id. at 765.
26
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) in majority opinion.
27
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
28
Id. at 777.
23
24
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v. City of Berkeley29 when it determined that ‚there is no significant state or public interest
in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot measure. Placing limits on contributions
which in turn limit expenditures plainly impairs freedom of expression.‛30
In the 90s, however, the Court began to show concern with the ability of corporatelevel wealth to exert undue influence in the marketplace of ideas. In 1990, for example,
the Court ruled in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce31 that ‚*c+orporate wealth can
unfairly influence elections when it is deployed in the form of independent expenditures,
just as it can when it assumes the guise of political contributions<‘The compelling
governmental interest in preventing corruption support[s] the restriction of the influence
of political war chests funneled through the corporate form.’‛32 The Court upheld
Michigan’s efforts ‚aim*ed+ at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s
support for the corporation’s political ideas.‛33 This ruling was a significant shift from the
argument in favor of corporate influence in the 70s and 80s and reflected the growing
concern of money’s corrupting power in politics.
Despite the Court’s ruling in Austin upholding a state’s right to protect the
electoral process from the corruption of corporate wealth, in 2000 the Court struck down
a ban on corporate contributions in state ballot issue campaigns in Montana Chamber of

Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981).
Id. at 299.
31
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
32
Id. at 659
33
Id. at 654, 659-60.
29
30
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Commerce v. Argenbright.34 In its opinion, the Court reverted back to the decision in Bellotti,
stating that it ‚is up to the voters to determine whether they approve or disapprove of a
corporation’s point of view.‛35 Despite this ruling, FECA still currently prohibits
corporate contributions on the federal level and 21 states presently have similar
prohibitions on corporate contributions.36
As this chapter outlines, there is an ongoing battle in the federal and state
legislatures, as well as in the courts, concerning whether restrictions on political speech
are necessary to preserve meaningful democracy or whether they are a violation of the
First Amendment. In 1976 the Supreme Court struck down parts of FECA as a violation
of First Amendment rights in Buckley v. Valeo. The Court, however, upheld limits on
individual contributions to candidates for Congress. The Court reasoned that this
restriction would directly serve the government’s interest in preventing ‚corruption and
the appearance of corruption.‛ 37 Since Buckley, the Supreme Court’s rulings on
campaign finance law have hinged on concrete proof of campaign corruption or the
appearance of corruption. This has set the standard, which requires that those seeking
campaign finance reform provide proof of such corruption. The purpose of this study is
to provide proof of such corruption in order to further the argument for additional
campaign finance reform. Although proving definitive ‚corruption‛ is beyond the scope
of this study, it does show the undue influence of money in politics, and how existing

Montgomery Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright, 226 F.3d 1049, 1052--53 (9th Cir. 2000).
Citing Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661 (1990)) at 600.
36
According to the Public Affairs Council at
http://www.pac.org/page/ethics/StatesthatProhibitCorporateContributions.shtml
37
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
34
35
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legal frameworks give a disproportionate voice to the wealthy. In addition, it shows the
‚appearance of corruption,‛ 38 which the Court has ruled to be damaging to the electoral
process, creating voter cynicism and apathy.

38

Id.
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THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE DEBATE

To understand the philosophical debate surrounding free political speech and
political integrity of the electoral process, it is necessary to first understand current
campaign finance laws, what they attempt to do, and how they attempt to do it. This
chapter provides a brief overview of federal campaign finance legislation and defines
key terminology. To give context to this case study, it also addresses how Louisiana
campaign finance law differs from federal law.
Key Components of Federal Campaign Finance Law
The struggle over campaign finance has long been a hallmark of American
politics. Congress passed the Tillman Act of 190739 in its first attempt to curtail
campaign contributions by corporations. Congress passed the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA) of 197140 in an effort to gain control over the increasing influence
of money in politics. Following the Watergate scandal and the rising costs of campaigns,
Congress amended FECA in 197441 to protect against new avenues of corruption. As the
first comprehensive attempt to regulate federal campaign financing, FECA consisted of
the following elements:
Oversight. The Act established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) for the
oversight and enforcement of campaign finance laws. The FEC is charged with

Tillman Act, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) of 1971, 2 U.S.C. 431-456 (2000).
41
FECA Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 403, 88 Stat. 1263, 1291-93 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. 9001-9013 (2000))
39
40
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disclosing campaign finance information, enforcing limits and prohibitions on
contributions, and overseeing public funding of presidential elections.42
Disclosure. Certain contributions and expenditures used to influence federal
elections must be reported to the FEC so it can make these disclosure reports available
to the public. Disclosure is supposed to ensure that the public can easily find the
financial sources of campaign messages.43
Individual Contributions. Contributions comprise the giving of money or
anything of value to a federal candidate or political committee for its use in influencing
federal elections. FECA placed limits on contributions by individuals and groups to
candidates, party committees, and PACs. These limits were changed in 2002 by BCRA.
Currently on the federal level, individuals can give up to $2,300 per candidate, per
election period; up to $28,500 per national party committee, per calendar year; up to
$10,000 per state, local, and district party committee, combined per calendar year; and
up to $5,000 per Political Action Committee, per calendar year.44
Individual Expenditures. According to federal law, expenditures differ from
contributions in that the spender maintains control over how the money is ultimately
used. There are two forms of expenditures, independent and coordinated. Independent
expenditures are made without coordinating with a candidate, a candidate’s committee,

Federal Election Commission, Federal Election Campaign Laws (October 2005) at 40.
Id. at 1.
44
Id. at 2.
42
43
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or political party. If expenditures are made in "coordination"45 with a campaign,
however, they may be regulated as contributions, subject to the same limits and
disclosure requirements.46 FECA limited expenditures by candidates and associated
committees, limited independent expenditures to $1000, and limited candidate
expenditures from personal funds.
In 1976, Buckley v. Valeo47 questioned the constitutionality of FECA’s limits on
independent expenditures. The Court upheld federal limits on campaign contributions,
but ruled that spending money to influence elections is a form of constitutionally
protected free speech. In striking down limits on campaign expenditures, the Court
determined that the laws could limit political contributions and spending only when
official candidate campaigns were involved, not when individuals and groups were
expressing political opinions. In terms of advertising, to establish that the message is
connected with an official candidate campaign, the Court required the use of the
phrases like ‚vote for,‛ ‚elect,‛ or ‚defeat.‛
Corporate Participation. FECA prohibited corporations from making campaign
contributions or expenditures to a federal candidate’s campaign. Corporations could,
however, set up PACs and solicit contributions to those PACs from its executives and
shareholders. In 1978, however, the Supreme Court ruled in First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti48 that a Massachusetts criminal statute prohibiting the expenditure of

Coordination is defined by the FEC as consulting, cooperating, or working in concert with or at the
request or suggestion of a candidate or party committee
46
Id. at 6.
47
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976).
48
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
45
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corporate funds ‚for the purpose of<influencing or affecting‛ voters’ opinions
infringed on corporations’ ‚protected speech in a manner unjustified by a compelling
state interest.‛49 Despite this ruling, corporations cannot make expenditures in
connection with federal elections. The prohibition on corporate contributions and
expenditures on the federal level has led to the development of new avenues for putting
money into campaigns, such as PACs and independent expenditures.
PACs. Stringent campaign finance laws put in place by the FEC coupled with the
rising cost of campaigns resulted in the increase of Political Action Committees (PACs)
and other interest groups as an avenue for additional campaign fund raising and
spending. PACs today, accused of distorting the democratic process, were viewed by
reformers of the 1970s as a way for individuals with common interests to get together to
make a difference in politics. Political Action Committees (PACs) are political
committees that come in two forms: connected PACs and non-connected PACs.
Connected PACs or candidate committees are official committees of federal candidates.
Non-connected PACs, also known as independent PACs, are not officially affiliated
with another entity. On the federal level, PACs have higher contribution limits than
individual contributors. They can contribute up to $5,000 per election to a federal
candidate; $15,000 annually to any national party committee, and $5,000 annually to
any other PAC. Federal PACs may be given up to $5,000 from any one individual.50

49
50

Id.
Federal Election Commission, Federal Election Campaign Laws (October 2005).

16

Post-Buckley politics have seen a significant rise in independent expenditures
through non-connected PACs including the 1980s expenditures by the American
Medical Association PAC and the Realtors’ PAC and the 1996 independent campaigns
launched by the AFL-CIO against Republican freshmen.51 Many argue that these nonconnected PACs are ‚loopholes’ in the system of campaign finance regulation that need
to be closed.52 Because these non-connected PACs can spend in ways that parties
cannot, National Conservative Political Action Committee Chairman Terry Dolan said:
‚A group like ours can lie through its teeth, and the candidate it helps stays clean.‛ 53
Others, however, contend that these groups contribute much needed participation to
the political process.54
Researching the effects of these non-connected PACs is often limited to the
reporting of total amounts of money spent specifically for and against candidates. For
this reason, much research dealing with these expenditures is concerned with their
uncontrolled influence over elections without restriction or accountability.55 In 1985,
Michael Malbin observed that these ‚independent‛ expenditures are often ‚The first
method for getting around limits that crosses most people’s minds<‛56 Larry Sabato
similarly argued that these groups are the ‚least accountable form of campaign
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spending‛57 that frequently use ‚negative, even vicious, messages and tactics *making+
any sort of civility in politics much more difficult to achieve.‛ 58
Other Campaign Finance “Battlegrounds”
As campaign finance reformists struggle to address existing loopholes in the law,
the rise of new political actors and avenues for spending create new loopholes and a
need for address by the Court and the FEC. Additional areas of concern over campaign
finance are as follows:
Issue Advocacy. As one avenue for political participation, issue advocacy
became popular starting in the late 1970s. The Annenberg Public Policy Center59
estimates that organizations spent more than two million dollars on issue advertising in
Washington DC in 2001 and 2002.60 There are two types of advocacy recognized in
federal elections: express advocacy and issue advocacy. According to federal
regulations, express advocacy is advocacy that uses particular ‚magic words‛61 like
‚elect,‛ ‚defeat,‛ ‚vote for,‛ or ‚vote against,‛ or when taken as a whole the
communication can only be interpreted by a ‚reasonable person‛ as advocating the
election or defeat of one or more clearly identified candidate(s). Under law, issue
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advocacy is defined as that which addresses issues, rather than candidates. Because
issue advocacy was viewed as independent from any candidate, prior to 2002 it was
completely unregulated.
Corporate Issue Advocacy. While corporations cannot make coordinated
contributions and expenditures, they can participate through issue advocacy. In 1978
the United States Supreme Court ruled in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti62 that
corporations had a First Amendment right to make contributions in order to attempt to
influence political processes. In his opinion, Justice Lewis Powell ruled that a
Massachusetts criminal statute prohibiting the expenditure of corporate funds "for the
purpose of ... influencing or affecting" voters' opinions infringed on corporations'
"protected speech in a manner unjustified by a compelling state interest."63 Others,
however, worry that this gives corporations a chance to corrupt the process with
corporate money. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist articulated why he felt
giving corporations this freedom might be dangerous: ‚A State grants to a business
corporation the blessings of potentially perpetual life and limited liability to enhance its
efficiency as an economic entity. It might reasonably be concluded that those properties,
so beneficial in the economic sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere.‛64
Pseudo-Issue Advocacy. As a result of Buckley’s ruling, parties and PACs often
produce ‚issue advertising,‛ which supports or opposes specific candidates, but avoids
the phrases outlined in Buckley. According to the Wisconsin Democratic Party the new
First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
Id. in concurring opinion.
64
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trend is hijacking of political elections by special interest groups using pseudo-issue
advocacy.65 The party goes on to describe ‚phony issue ads‛ as those that remain under
the radar of expenditure regulations by avoiding the magic words ‚vote for‛ or ‚vote
against.‛ By doing so, these individuals or groups are not required to disclose the
funding sources for the advertising. Due to this lack of disclosure, it is difficult to track
where the money is coming from and how much of it there is.66
Soft Money. Beyond issue advocacy, individuals and PACs have discovered
additional ways to spend money ‚outside‛ official candidates’ campaigns. Campaign
money comes in two forms: ‚hard money‛ and ‚soft money.‛ Hard money refers to
donations made directly to political candidates. These donations must be declared with
the name of the donor, which becomes public knowledge, and are limited by legislation.
Soft money is money that is not made directly to a candidate's campaign, but is spent on
an activity, such as issue advocacy or grassroots efforts.
In 1979 FECA was amended to allow party committees to accept and spend
unlimited amounts of soft money during campaign elections. The Act intended the
money to be spent on grass roots ‚getting out the vote efforts,‛67 but following passage,
the parties began using the money on political issue advertising. As long as these ads
avoided the phrases outlined in Buckley, the parties circumvented finance restrictions
and disclosure.
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As a result, in 2002 Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
(BCRA)68 prohibiting the raising and spending of soft money by federal officeholders,
candidates, and national parties. It severely restricted the use of soft money by state and
local parties in relation to federal election activities, 69 in an attempt to curb the influence
of corporate and labor money in federal elections. Despite the breadth of BCRA’s
restrictions, many politicians and members of Congress argue that BCRA does not
directly or conclusively address the increasingly significant impact of non-connected
PACs and independent expenditures. They argue that these supposedly issue-based
political organizations are able to escape the contribution limits imposed on parties,
campaign committees, candidates, and officials, while continuing to ‚engage in thinlyveiled partisan activities.‛70
In 2003 McConnell v. FEC71 challenged BCRA, but the Supreme Court upheld
‚Congress’ effort to plug the soft money loophole and its regulation of electioneering
communications.‛72 However, the Court invalidated the Act’s requirement that parties
choose between either making independent expenditures or coordinated expenditures
on behalf of candidates. In addition, the Court contended that campaign finance
regulations are only justifiable to curtail the type of corruption that causes a change in
legislative votes. It argued that soft money can lead not only to changes in legislative
Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., 36 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.) (popularly referred to as the
"McCain-Feingold" legislation after its Senate sponsors).
69
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votes, but manipulation in various aspects of legislative business. While this ruling
affects the use of corporate and union money in all federal elections, it has not been
applied to elections on the state and local level.
Louisiana Law
With a former governor currently behind bars, a Congressman currently under
indictment for soliciting bribes, money laundering, and racketeering (to name a few),
Louisiana is a state with what political scientist Wayne Parent refers to as ‚an
unparalleled record of political corruption.‛73 In 1949 V. O. Key singled Louisiana out in
his classic work Southern Politics in a chapter titled ‚The Seamy Side of Democracy.‛74
Given such, Louisiana is a good place to examine campaign finance law and local
manifestations of political corruption.
Oversight. To understand the case of BRNext, it is important to understand areas
in which Louisiana campaign finance laws are similar to federal law and areas in which
they differ from federal law. One area in which the two are similar is the area of
oversight. On the federal level the FEC oversees and enforces campaign finance
regulations. In Louisiana, campaign finance is overseen by the Louisiana Board of
Ethics and the Supervisory Committee on Campaign Finance. The Louisiana Board of
Ethics is empowered to administer and enforce laws within its jurisdiction, represent
the public interest in the administration of any law, and offer and enter into consent
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opinions regarding violations of law.75 The board consists of eleven members, seven
appointees selected by the governor and two each nominated by the House and
Senate.76 Board members are supported by an administrative staff which consists of an
Ethics Administrator, a Deputy General Counsel, and four supporting attorneys.
The FEC has been called the ‚toothless tiger.‛77 The Louisiana Ethics Board is
also worthy of this name. The board, solid in theory, is in reality rendered ineffective by
vague laws and poor structure. According to former Deputy General Counsel of the
Louisiana Ethics Board, Maris LeBlanc, violations of Louisiana campaign finance law
are difficult to detect and prosecute.78 Rather than actively seeking violations, the
Louisiana Ethics Board relies on filed complaints by those knowledgeable of illegal or
unethical activity. For example, a case was brought to the attention of the Ethics Board
concerning the 1987 campaign of Doug Green, a candidate for Insurance Commissioner.
After investigating the complaint, Green was found to have accepted more than $2
million from a different number of companies funded by a family that owned a local
insurance company. Many of those involved were sentenced to federal prison.79 Leblanc
said had this not been brought to the attention of the Board by a knowledgeable party,
it may have gone unnoticed.80
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Disclosure. In addition, the board is charged with disclosing contributions and
expenditures, as well as investigating any alleged violations of the law. Financial
reports are disclosed through the Ethics Board website.
Contributions. Disclosure is important in Louisiana, considering the many
avenues for contribution. Louisiana law differs significantly from federal law in that it
allows corporations to contribute directly to candidates and committees. In Louisiana,
individuals and corporations may give up to $5,000 to a candidate’s campaign or
candidate PAC. A candidate PAC, which is treated differently than an independent
PAC, can then contribute a maximum of $5,000 to a candidate’s campaign – unless it is a
Big PAC, 81 in which case it can contribute up to $10,000. Contributions, in-kind
contributions, loans, endorsements, or guarantees on loans are all counted toward the
contribution limits.82 However, if the PAC is ‚non-connected‛ or ‚independent‛ – if it
is set up for issue advocacy, not candidate endorsement – then individuals and
corporations may contribute up to $100,000.83
Expenditures. In addition to contributions, individuals and corporations can
make expenditures in efforts to affect elections. As on the federal level, Louisiana
expenditures are classified either as independent or coordinated. Individuals,
corporations, and PACs can make unlimited independent expenditures on behalf of a
candidate. If the expenditures are coordinated, however, they are considered in-kind
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contributions and subject to contribution limits.84 Leblanc says the Louisiana law is very
clear about the prohibition of coordination between non-connected PACs and
candidates. According to the law, expenditures made in coordination with a candidate
or candidate PAC are considered contributions and subject to the contribution limits.85
However, Leblanc admits, ‚It’s easy to see that is the rule, but it is difficult to prove that
someone has violated it.‛ Because this can be so tricky, Leblanc suggests looking to see
if the same people are involved in a candidate committee and a political committee or if
they use the same public relations firm or advertising agency.86
PACs. In Louisiana, political action committees (PACs) are either classified as
candidate committees or political committees. Political committees are Louisiana’s
equivalent to federal non-connected PACS. They are required to maintain
independence from any candidate and have higher contribution and expenditure limits.
For this reason, Louisiana PACs that avoid collusion with a candidate or candidate
committee can put much more money into a given election.87
Issue Advocacy. Louisiana PACs, like federal PACs, often participate in issue
advertising. In terms of regulating issue advocacy on the state level, Louisiana law does
not directly address the problem. Whereas the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act sought
to stop express advocacy disguised as issue advocacy (often referred to as pseudo-issue
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advocacy) on the federal level, there is no such law for Louisiana campaigns. In a 1999
advisory letter, however, the Louisiana Board of Ethics stated that ‚if the message is
unmistakable, unambiguous, and suggestive of only one meaning, and if that meaning
is an expression of preference of one candidate over another candidate, then the
underlying contributions and expenditures should be reported as otherwise required by
applicable provisions of the CFDA *Campaign Finance Disclosure Act+.‛ 88 In addition,
in a 2005 opinion, imposing a $20,000 fine on the Republican State Leadership
Committee, the Board held that the campaign finance disclosure requirements are
applicable where ‚any viewer of the advertisement would understand, even without
explicit word[s] of express advocacy, that when taken as a whole and in its factual
context, the unmistakable intent of the advertisement was to oppose or otherwise
influence an election.‛89 Issue advocacy has yet to be defined or included in Louisiana
campaign finance statutes. These rulings suggest a need for address and clarification in
the overall law.
In summary, this chapter outlines key components of federal campaign finance
law, citing the rationale behind each. It addresses key campaign finance
‚battlegrounds‛ including corporate participation, PAC participation, the use of
pseudo-issue advocacy, and the use of supposedly independent expenditures. Finally, it
highlights significant differences in Louisiana and federal campaign finance law,
particularly the allowance of corporate contributions.
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BRNEXT AND THE 2004 MAYORAL RACE

L. Lane Grigsby, age 65, founded his contracting company, Cajun Constructors,
in 1973.90 Over the next fifteen years the company experienced tremendous growth
reaching $35 million in contract revenues. In 1998 it reached $139 million in revenues
and has currently completed over $2 billion in contracts nationwide. Recently, the firm
won state bids for several cleanup and reconstruction projects in New Orleans
following Hurricane Katrina; these included helping to pump floodwater out of the city
and rebuilding the Industrial Canal levee.91 In addition to owning Cajun Constructors,
Grigsby serves on the board of Directors for The Shaw Group, a multi-million dollar
contracting firm that has been named to Fortune magazines ‚Fortune 500 List‛ several
times.92 He also has 16 active corporations and three political action committees
registered with the state of Louisiana.
Generally speaking, according to Louisiana law Grigsby would have several
conventional ways of affecting the election. As an individual he could contribute $5,000
to the Kip Holden campaign. Also, as an individual, he could make unlimited
expenditures in an effort to defeat Simpson or elect Holden by disclosing that the
messages came from him, Lane Grigsby. Affecting politics is nothing new for Grigsby.
He has been affecting elections since 1988 and has been involved in over 70 legislative
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races.93 He is currently under investigation for coordination with a candidate in the 2006
Senate race. He admittedly ‚whacked‛ one candidate, William Daniels, with $20,000
worth of mailouts publicizing his divorce. Just recently, he took a full-page
advertisement out in his local newspaper soliciting candidates to run for state
representative.94

As Grigsby’s political past illustrates, people are often rewarded for finding
creative ways of stretching or manipulating the law in electoral politics. By making use
of legal loopholes, the wealthy are able to inject larger amounts of money into the
process than intended by law. This study is an example of such legal manipulation.
Rather than using conventional avenues for spending, Grigsby made use of Louisiana’s
vague and loophole-ridden laws by sending his money and his company’s money
through various channels, thus, putting more money into the election than intended by
law and doing so under the guise of an issue-based political committee.
Grigsby formed the PAC BRNext in January 2004. To achieve maximum electoral
impact, Grigsby recruited well-connected political players to run it.95 He recruited
media consultant George Kennedy, brother of Louisiana State Treasurer John Kennedy
and former consultant to Lt. Governor Mitch Landrieu; executive director and
spokesperson Caroline Roemer, daughter of former Louisiana Governor Buddy
Roemer; and general consultant Pat Bergeron, former Louisiana BREC commissioner
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and Assistant Elections Commissioner.96 As seasoned politicians and political
consultants, BRNext’s managers were well trained to affect elections.
In the beginning, Kennedy and Grigsby presented BRNext to the public as a
grassroots movement, comprising of members of the community. They promised that it
would stay positive in tone and focus on the issues. Its website announced that BRNext
‚formed as the next step to vigorously participate in local electoral politics.‛ 97 In
addition, the PAC announced that it intended to make issue spots that would empower
the people and the press to begin having an honest debate about the mayoral election.98
BRNext’s media plan included television spots, news releases, public relations
events, and a website. Television, the PAC’s primary medium, targeted what Kennedy
called high-propensity voters, or those who had voted in the last six elections. 99
According to Kennedy, the news releases were not only targeted at the press, but at the
Simpson campaign as well. He said the releases were designed as an element of ‚Psychop‛ or ‚psychological operation‛ aimed at the Bobby Simpson campaign. He said,
‚Psychologically it stirs your opponent up, leaving them *sic+ chasing their tail. It got
*Simpson’s+ campaign off their message and caused them to be more modest about their
product claims.‛100 BRNext used public relations events to attract and inform potential
investors, and the website, abandoned shortly after the beginning of the campaign,
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targeted interested individuals and the press.101
To ensure maximum impact, the group used software called TV Scan to find the
perfect fit between the PAC’s budget and its target demographics.102 The breakout spot,
a one-minute commercial depicting people around Baton Rouge with the tag: ‚The pain
of change is the price of progress,‛103 attempted to achieve name identification and
feelings of good will. Following this ad, BRNext’s message began to shift from broad
issues toward more specific ones, including traffic and crime. The messages also shifted
from blaming vague ‚leadership‛ to naming Simpson in particular. The second and
fourth commercials discussed crime and traffic, blaming nonspecific Baton Rouge
‚leadership.‛104 The third commercial listed Homeland Security expenditures by mayorincumbent Bobby Simpson including skittles and peppermint patties.105 The fifth
commercial depicted two faceless candidates that expressed opposing views on various
subjects. The commercial then revealed that both candidates were in fact Simpson. 106
The PAC’s negative campaign against Simpson culminated with a final television spot
that depicted a baboon tossing money into the air while a voice-over said, ‚The mayor’s
secret traffic plan; a north loop to nowhere. Simpson tried to hide it. On election day,
don’t be fooled again.‛107
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As a result of the group’s shift to negative campaigning, many contributors
pulled out of BRNext, and some demanded their money back.108 One member that
pulled out, fundraiser Chris Hicks, said that he and other contributors felt that by
violating its mission, BRNext betrayed the public and them. Another former member
cited BRNext’s focus ‚on the agenda of its chairman, Lane Grigsby, who *was+
bankrolling the political action committee with loans‛ as his reason for leaving the
group.109 In an interview, Kennedy claimed BRNext had to ‚shift gears‛ because other
candidates failed to pick up on their anti-Simpson message.110 This statement, however,
seems naïve considering that generally negative campaigning has often been the
function of independent expenditures. As National Conservative Political Action
Committee Chairman Terry Dolan said: ‚A group like ours can lie through its teeth, and
the candidate it helps stays clean.‛111
According to Kennedy, this shifting of gears meant connecting the dots from the
issues to Simpson, saying to voters, ‚See. Be mad at him.‛112 Grigsby defended the shift
in tactics and mocked his critics for their naiveté. He attributed the exodus from BRNext
to people’s ‚false sense of being engaged in politics,‛ because they gave ‚a little bit of
money.‛ He said, ‚Some people gave me their money and trusted that I would perform
in a manner which would not embarrass them. And I had to give some of them their
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money back<They didn’t want to be a part of an attack on the current administration.
It takes courage to tell the emperor he’s naked.‛113
Kennedy echoed Grigsby’s attitude, claiming neither he nor Grigsby cared if they
angered its members or even voters. He said there was no real downside for BRNext.
Had the group been unsuccessful at ousting Simpson, Kennedy said Simpson would
still have taken ‚a major hickey‛ and BRNext would have been viable ‚with money still
hammering on Simpson.‛ He summed this sentiment up in a mixed metaphor when he
said, ‚We were baking a cake and didn’t know what kind of cake it was going to be. We
just knew that when it came out the oven, it was gonna be cooked.‛
At the end of the day, BRNext did indeed ‚cook‛ its cake. In November 2004,
East Baton Rouge parish elected Holden as the first African-American mayor-president.
Holden defeated incumbent Simpson by nearly 15,000 votes.114 While it is impossible to
definitively link Holden’s success to BRNext’s campaign, research and opinions suggest
a connection. Not surprisingly, Kennedy and Grigsby credited BRNext with having a
significant impact on the election. Kennedy said follow-up polls suggested that BRNext
stopped Simpson’s growth, boasting that ‚We capped his growth by killing him with
paper cuts.‛115 Grigsby echoed this view, insisting that the ‚single thing that pulled
Bobby Simpson down was BRNext<There is no doubt in my mind.‛116 Grigsby and
Kennedy, however, were not the only ones who saw its impact.
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Media outlets agreed. A pollster with Southern Media Opinion Research said
‚Simpson may have been the only Republican in Louisiana who didn’t benefit from
sharing the ballot with Bush. US Senator David Vitter and US Representative Richard
Baker, both Republicans, were strong in the parish, but when you come down to the
mayor, it’s a different story, so there must have been something that was interjected
into the race that had a profound impact, and guess who it was? BRNext.‛117 The
pollster said he thinks at least part of Simpson’s problem was due to the ‚11th hour ad
campaign launched by BRNext.‛118
The Greater Baton Rouge Business Report also considered BRNext to be a key
ingredient to Simpson’s defeat:

<BRNext!, despite complaints of negativity, managed to exploit Simpson's
negatives, and the incumbent's only response was to attack Holden's legislative
voting record. As one Republican who voted for Holden said, ‘Bobby never
refuted the BRNext! charges. He only said it was negative campaigning and
responded by going negative against Holden.’ Finally, there was a growing
sense, real or not, by many in South Baton Rouge and elsewhere that Simpson
was doing little to move Baton Rouge forward. In the end, it was all too much for
Simpson to overcome.119
Following the election, the defeated Simpson attested to the power of the group when
he said: ‚Baton Rouge Next was a third-party, soft-money group, and if that’s what this
public wants us to go through in the future, they’ve spoken. I guess the public makes
that decision.‛120
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When challenged about BRNext’s influence on the election, Kennedy and
Grigsby both insisted that their political involvement through BRNext came from
altruistic motives. Kennedy publicly asserted that BRNext, an entity supposedly
backed by wealthy citizens practicing noblesse oblige, represented ‚the new
philanthropy.‛121 However, that claim rang hollow when he privately boasted: ‚Give
me $2 million and I don’t care who the governor is,‛ he said, ‚I can give them a 45
percent negative.‛122 Grigsby also claimed his efforts were selfless, echoing Kennedy
when he called BRNext part of the ‚philanthropic movement of the future,‛ where
‚people recognize that they can make a larger impact with their wealth than they ever
dreamed possible.‛ He even compared himself to Carnegie, saying he was using his
wealth to better the community, only expecting good government in return.123 This
study, however, suggests that the legal framework facilitates improper and cynical
abuse of the system, resulting in the ‚appearance of corruption.‛124
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Id.
123 Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (May, 14 2007).
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Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
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WHAT BRNEXT MEANS FOR DEMOCRACY

BRNext: Behind the Image
Interviews with Grigsby and Kennedy, and an in-depth look at campaign finance
records, revealed that BRNext was a major financial endeavor by one individual, Lane
Grigsby. Through this PAC, his corporations, his family, and contacts, Grigsby was able
to funnel a large amount of money into the 2004 mayor’s race within Louisiana’s existing
legal framework. In the areas where it appears that Grigsby and BRNext may have
skirted the edge of legality or at least violated the spirit of Louisiana’s laws, the oversight
and enforcement agency was either unaware of the violations, chose to ignore them, or
was hindered by vague and loophole-ridden laws. BRNext, formed with the primary
intent of ousting incumbent Mayor Bobby Simpson,125 was able to participate in the
election in several ways. As a registered non-connected PAC, BRNext was able to
circumvent contribution and expenditure restrictions through corporate contributions
and loans, pseudo-issue advocacy, and ‚independent‛ expenditures. In addition, BRNext
and Grigsby were able to avoid legal interference either by virtue of their personal clout
with the enforcement agency or negligence on the agency’s part. This chapter outlines the
ways in which BRNext and Grigsby were able to participate in the 2004 election,
discusses what this means for democracy, and gives suggestions for policy change.

Interview with George Kennedy, Media Consultant, BRNext, in Baton Rouge, La. (April 22, 2005);
Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (April 25, 2007).
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Corporate Contributions & Unpaid Loans. At the heart of this discussion is the
question of how BRNext was truly funded. In the spirit of the law, PACs are supposed
to be funded by a collection of like-minded citizens who, by pooling their resources, can
impact the electoral process. BRNext was not such a group. In an interview, Grigsby
said he made an initial investment of $300,000 to BRNext through various financial
avenues.126 According to Louisiana campaign finance law, individuals and corporations
can give $100,000 to PACs. This limit includes loans and in-kind contributions. Records
suggest that Grigsby funneled more than $450,000 into BRNext by the end of the
mayoral election, using his companies, loans, and other individuals.127
According to the Louisiana Secretary of State’s commercial division’s
corporations database, Grigsby has 31 registered corporations, 16 of which are active.
Of these 16, three contributed to BRNext through loans. Loans made to BRNext
included loans made by Grigsby, his company Cajun Contractors, his company Grigsby
Properties, his wife Bobbi Grigsby, Cajun Contractors vice president Milton Graugnard,
and a corporation which Grigsby is part owner, Kyle Associates. In 2004, Cajun
Constructors loaned BRNext $140,382.58. (Again, under Louisiana law, loans are also
subject to contribution limits.128 This loan, therefore, is a violation of the $100,000
contribution limit.) BRNext reported a payment back to Cajun for $140,497.34. Grigsby
Properties loaned BRNext $30,100, which BRNext reported returning. However,

Interview with George Kennedy, Media Consultant, BRNext, in Baton Rouge, La. (April 22, 2005);
Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (April 25, 2007).
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Grigsby personally loaned BRNext $100,000 and has yet to be paid back. Grigsby said
he loand BRNext the money in case others later decided to ‚jump on the bandwagon‛
and he could pay himself back.(Though he later said, he never intended to get the
money back).129 His wife, Bobbi Grigsby loaned BRNext $50,000 and has yet to be paid
back. Milton Graugnard, Cajun Contractors’ vice president, loaned BRNext $25,000 in
2004 and has yet to be paid back. Finally, one of Grigsby’s companies, Kyle Associates,
loaned BRNext $12,500 in 2005 and has yet to receive payment. Beyond loans,
Grigsby’s wife also made a contribution of $50,000 to BRNext. His company, Cajun
Constructors, contributed $20,100, and his vice president contributed $30, 014.82.

This was all done in accordance with Louisiana law as pertains to contributions
to an independent PAC (with exception to the loan from Cajun Contractors). These
loans and contributions are problematic, however, in two ways. First, the law states that
it is illegal to give in the name of another.130 It is problematic, then, that Grigsby claims
to have, himself, given BRNext $300,000.131 This suggests that Grigsby’s wife and vice
president gave in his place. Secondly, had BRNext registered as a candidate PAC – and
it clearly operated as one – Grigsby and each of his entities would have only been
permitted a $5,000 contribution each to BRNext, which would have severely diminished
its coffers. Based on Grigsby’s statement and financial records, however, it appears that
Grigsby, through his companies, his wife, and his vice president, gave BRNext a total of
Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (May, 14 2007): Grigsby said
R. S. 18:1505.2 B; Prohibited Practices: “Making contributions or loans through or in the name of another.”
131 Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (May, 14 2007): Grigsby said, ‚I
loaned BRNext a whole bunch of money. BRNext has never paid me back. It’s not going to. I knew it
wasn’t going to.‛
129
130
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$458,097.40 through contributions and loans. Even following loan repayments, Grigsby
himself spent $287,614.82.132 This is a prime example of how the law allows individuals
to give more money than intended through their various entities.

Grigsby acknowledged this vulnerability in the system: ‚If you want to get
involved in a state legislature campaign they say you can only give $2,500. Per entity!
I’ve got ten entities. I’m in for $25,000. It’s very easy. Now what you do is once you get
in there, you start trying to shape people’s thought process.‛133
He further outlined his efforts when he said, ‚With BRNext what I did was I got
a little bit of money from about 50 people<and then I put, or my entities that I
incurred, put about $300,000 into the BRNext campaign [reports indicate it was more
like $450,000+ <The fact of the matter is<within a PAC if you hold it tightly you can
put enough money in there and not have to go knockin’ on doors.‛ Grigsby said he
primarily used loans to put money into BRNext. When asked about being paid back,
Grigsby said, ‚You put your money in, and you’re not going to get it back. I never
intended to get it back.‛134 This raises questions about who monitors these loans to
ensure they are legitimate and whether are not they are paid back or listed as defaulted
on IRS forms. Without access to financial records it is difficult to determine whether
Grigsby drew from his personal accounts or whether he, his wife, and vice president
drew from the same corporate treasury.
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before loan payments $433,097.40.
Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in Baton Rouge, La. (May 14, 2007).
134 Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (May, 14 2007).
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Finally, another contracting company in which Grigsby is on the board of
directors, Shaw (now publicly owned and traded), contributed $50,000 to BRNext.
Shaw’s founder, Jim Bernhard contributed $50,000. In addition, Jim Bernhard, his wife,
and son contributed $15,000 to Kip Holden’s campaign. Bernhard, his family, and Shaw
apparently approved of BRNext’s campaign, as they did not pull out of the group or
request their money back following the PACs negative shift. While these contributions
are in accordance with legal limits, they provide further connections between the two
political camps and raise the question of whether contracting corporations, which
actively seek contracts with the city and state, should be allowed to use their corporate
wealth to affect campaigns.

Issue Advocacy. Because Grigsby was able to put so much money into BRNext,
he had access to expensive airtime, a prime means of reaching voters. BRNext reported
a total of $311,963.61 spent on advertising and media buys. Because these ads avoided
words of ‚express‛ advocacy, they were not subject to the same disclosure and
contribution limits. Had the ads been treated as express advocacy, they would have
been considered in-kind contributions, subject to the $5,000 limit. So, they would not
have been permitted by law.
In a 2005 opinion, imposing a $20,000 fine on the Republican State Leadership
Committee, the Louisiana Board of Ethics held that the campaign finance disclosure
requirements and expenditure limits are applicable where ‚any viewer of the
advertisement would understand, even without explicit word[s] of express advocacy,
39

that when taken as a whole and in its factual context, the unmistakable intent of the
advertisement was to oppose or otherwise influence an election.‛135
Kennedy said that contrary to BRNext’s public image, the group formed with the
primary intent of unseating incumbent Mayor Bobby Simpson.136 Grigsby confirmed
this when he said, ‚It was ABB; Anybody But Bobby.‛137 Though BRNext’s commercials
did not use the ‚magic words‛138 outlined in Buckley, they did explicitly advocate
opposition to Simpson with lines like, ‚The mayor’s secret traffic plan, a north loop to
nowhere. Simpson tried to hide it. On election day, don’t be fooled again.‛139 In an
interview Grigsby said, ‚A third-party PAC can do whatever they want to. As long as
you don’t endorse a candidate you can spend whatever you want to enhance his
campaign.‛140 According to the Ethics Board, however, any advertisement that seeks to
‚oppose or otherwise influence an election‛ 141 is express advocacy and should be
considered an in-kind contribution, subject to contribution limits.
Under the Board of Ethics ruling, BRNext should have reported the commercials
as in-kind expenditures for the Kip Holden campaign. In addition, the PAC should
have been registered as a candidate committee, not a non-connected committee. Had it

Louisiana Board of Ethics, Campaign Finance Ruling No. 2003-746 (Jan. 13, 2005).
Interview with George Kennedy, Media Consultant, BRNext, in Baton Rouge, La. (April 22, 2005).
137 Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (May, 14 2007).
138 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976).
139 Commercial: TV Spot 7- Loop (Available at www.brnext.org).
140 Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (May, 14 2007).
141 Louisiana Board of Ethics, Campaign Finance Ruling No. 2003-746 (Jan. 13, 2005).
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done so, BRNext would have only been allowed to contribute $5,000 to the Holden
campaign.142 Instead, BRNext reported a total of $311,963.61 spent on advertising and
media buys.143
“Independent” Expenditures. BRNext was able to avoid candidate contribution
limits by registering as a non-connected PAC. Therefore, its expenditures were deemed
‚independent,‛ rather than coordinated with the Holden campaign. Although, again,
this study does not attempt to undertake the task of definitively proving that
coordination, the overlapping expenditures made by BRNext and the Holden campaign
certainly give the appearance of such coordination – or, in other words, the appearance
of corruption.
For its advertising campaign, BRNext hired well-known political consultant
George Kennedy. In the past, Kennedy has worked with media consultant Rannah
Gray, who was also Kip Holden’s144 media consultant and spokesperson.145 Under
Louisiana campaign finance law, contributions include ‚expenditures made by any
person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of,
a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents and shall be considered
to be a contribution to such a candidate.‛146 So, the fact that both Kennedy and Gray

R.S. 18:1505.2 H, K
Due to the nature of the disclosure reports, it is difficult to determine what money was spent on what
form of advertising.
144 Kip Holden was contacted three times for an interview, but did not respond back.
145 Jim Brown, The Feds Continue to Stick it to Us, POLITICS LA.COM, December 17, 2003
146 R. S. 18:1483 (6) b.i.
146 Jeremy Alford, The Character Assassin, THE INDEPENDENT WEEKLY, October 18, 2006:
“Kennedy seems comfortable here at Compose Digital Design in Baton Rouge, a hub of sorts for some of
the most talented communications specialists in the state. He’s a longtime client, but it’s difficult to tell.
His awards are displayed in the lobby alongside accolades for the partners, and he enjoys free reign over
142
143
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worked together in the past and during this election, and the fact that they both worked
out of the address 7650 Old Hammond Highway, at least gives the appearance of
coordination.147 In addition, Gray is listed as a partner of Marmillion/Gray Marketing
and Media. The Baton Rouge branch of Marmillion/Gray also lists the same Old
Hammond Highway address as Compose Digital, the company that Kennedy and Gray
both work out of.148
BRNext and the Holden campaign reported similar expenditures to these
consultants and their companies. In campaign disclosure records BRNext reported
expenditures to Kennedy, Kennedy’s employer Compose Digital Design, and Gray’s
company Gray Marketing and Media. The PAC reported $47,264.90 paid to Compose
Digital Design, $72,000 to Kennedy, and $230,434 to Gray Marketing and Media. In
disclosure reports, Holden similarly reported expenditures to Compose Digital,
Kennedy’s employer; Marmillion/Gray, Gray’s company; and Rannah Gray herself.
Holden reported paying $928 to Compose Digital, $14,000 to Marmillion/Gray, and
$234,104 to Rannah Gray. While it is difficult to prove conclusively that Kennedy and
Gray worked together on the 2004 mayor’s race, working out of the same office and
receiving money from both BRNext and Holden is compelling information and enough

the entire facility.”
146 Secretary of States corporation database available at www.sos.louisiana.gov.
146According to the website www.marmillion.com and the American Association of Political Consultants
membership roster.
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to prove at least the ‚appearance of corruption.‛149 To avoid this, BRNext’s expenditures
should have been reported as in-kind contributions or coordinated expenditures, which
would have been subject to limits.
Oversight/Enforcement. Not only are BRNext’s consulting relationships
troubling, so too is its connection with the oversight and enforcement agency, the Board
of Ethics. Gray Sexton150 is the appointed Ethics Administrator, serving as general
counsel to the board,151 managing the collection and dissemination of any material or
reports required to be filed with the board pursuant to any law,152 and sometimes, after
consultation with the Chairman of the board, issuing advisory opinions.153 It is therefore
troubling that Gray Sexton is listed as a registered agent for 18 of Grigsby’s 31
registered corporations, and as director of one. An employee of Sexton, Alice Diez, is
listed as the registered agent of BRNext. In addition, the address listed for BRNext is
that of ‚The Law Offices of Gray Sexton.‛154 Diez is also listed as the registered agent of
Grigsby’s two new PACs, TigerPAC and LANext.
Sexton’s position is a Louisiana Civil Service position, and as such, is under civil
service rules and regulations. Under Chapter 14 in the Civil Service Rules, Louisiana
employees are prohibited from engaging in political activity and taking ‚active part in
the management of affairs of a political party, faction, candidate, or any political

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
Sexton was contacted for an interview, but instead recommended Maris LeBlanc.
151 Louisiana Board of Ethics Rules 4:401 A. 1
152 Louisiana Board of Ethics Rules 401 A 7
153 Louisiana Board of Ethics Rules 605
154 Call made to the address registered with the Louisiana Secretary of State’s office.
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campaign, except to exercise his right as a citizen to express his opinion privately.‛155
According to the Board of Ethics Rules, a ‚public servant is prohibited from receiving
any thing of economic value for any service which<is substantially related to the duties
and responsibilities, programs, or operations of the agency of the public servant.‛156
Under these rules, neither Sexton nor his employee should have been involved with
BRNext or Grigsby.
Also, ‚any legal entity in which the public servant exercises control or 25%, is
prohibited from receiving any thing of economic value for services rendered to<any
person who conducts operations or activities which are regulated by the employee’s
agency; OR any person who has a substantial economic interest which may be
substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the public employee’s
official job.‛157 Because Grigsby and BRNext registered with the Board of Ethics and
because Grigsby stands to benefit from Sexton’s ‚nonperformance,‛ this relationship is
a violation of rules. In addition, as a civil service employee, the ethics administrator is
expected to work at least 40 hours a week and can earn from $47,570 and $119,267 a
year.158 It is questionable that Sexton can maintain a law firm, servicing clients like
Grigsby, and act full-time as Ethics Administrator.
During this study, the Louisiana House of Representatives approved a bill to
restrict the legal practices of Sexton outside of his state work. This came as a result of a

Civil Service Rules 14.1 (e) 1,4
Louisiana Board of Ethics Rules 111C(1)
157 Louisiana Board of Ethics Rules 111C(2)(d)
158 Louisiana Civil Service website at www.dscs.state.la.us
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March 2006 dispute in which members of the Jefferson Parish Council sought Ethics
Board intervention when Lane Grigsby’s Cajun Constructors hired Kyle Associates (a
company in which Grigsby held a 26% interest in) to inspect their work building safe
houses for east bank pump operators. Sexton appeared before the council as Grigsby’s
attorney, not as Ethics Board chief. He was also a registered agent for both Cajun
Constructors and Kyle Associates at the time. 159
Whether or not Sexton’s relationship with Grigsby affected his role as Ethics
Administrator in the case of BRNext cannot be proven. The possibility and perception
of unethical activity, however, is damaging to the electoral process and a direct
violation of civil service rules.
In addition to problems with the structure of the oversight and enforcement
agency, there are problems with the procedures of enforcement. As former Deputy
General Counsel of the Louisiana Ethics Board, Maris LeBlanc, said, ‚Without someone
filing a complaint it would be difficult to investigate and take action<It takes someone
with knowledge to put it all together and point that out to *the Ethics Board+.‛
According to the Board’s procedure for filing complaints, ‚it takes a vote of at least
eight *of 11+ members of the Board to refer a complaint to investigation.‛ 160 Complaints
concerning election integrity must include a ‚receipt of a sworn statement by any voter
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of this state alleging error, fraud, irregularity, or other unlawful activity in the conduct
of an election<‛161 These requirements put a large burden of proof on average citizens.
This section has outlined the ways in which BRNext and Grigsby were able to
inject a large amount of money into the 2004 election using various campaign finance
loopholes in a vague campaign finance framework of laws. A lack of oversight by the
Ethics Board and corporate contributions and loans, pseudo-issue advertising, and
independent expenditures, Grigsby was able to open the electoral process up to at least
the appearance of corruption. He used his corporate and personal wealth to contribute
to and ‚loan‛ BRNext enough money to purchase large amounts of broadcast time to
air ads that supposedly addressed issues but, in reality, were attacks on Simpson. He
did so by creating a political action committee, projected to the public as a grassroots
movement. The next section will discuss each particular loophole used by Grigsby, how
each affects democracy, and how each might be prevented in the future.
BRNext and Democracy
The case of BRNext strengthens the argument that people of wealth can possess a
disproportionate voice in politics by either manipulating or simply ignoring campaign
finance laws. As West argues in Checkbook Democracy, the courts ‚mistakenly have
equated freedom of speech with freedom to spend.‛162 Not only are interest groups and
large corporations able to use financial leverage to affect elections, but one person of
means can as well. The use of PACs, pseudo-issue advocacy, and campaign
Rules for the Board of Ethics and Supervisory Committee of the Louisiana Campaign Finance
Disclosure Act 707 B
162 DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK DEMOCRACY: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 171 (2000).
161
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electioneering denigrates elections, causes cynicism and voter apathy, and hinders
accountability (whether real or perceived) for elected officials.
The question of whether Grigsby’s actions were in accordance with the law or in
violation of it is a difficult one to answer. So far, this type of behavior has been
permitted by loophole-ridden, vague, or unenforced laws. In terms of federal law, West
contends: ‚What used to represent a reasonably clear set of rules for the game now has
given way to a bewildering variety of tangled laws, confusing regulations, blatant
loopholes, and selective enforcement of what guidelines remain‛163 resulting in ‚the
toleration of big contributions from privileged elements within society<‛164 Those
against campaign finance reform discount these claims and the notion that without
reform economic inequalities give the wealthy a disproportionate share of influence in
politics.165 BRNext is evidence that this statement also holds true for Louisiana law.
The evidence in the case of BRNext and the 2004 mayoral election furthers the
argument put forth by those in favor of further reform. By funneling money through a
‚non-connected‛ PAC, Grigsby was able to purchase large amounts of broadcast
advertising time to air thinly veiled anti-Simpson commercials. In addition, he was able
to hire a savvy, well-connected political consultant to man his attack against Simpson.
Finally, as a wealthy individual he was able to hire a prominent attorney who is also
administrator of the oversight and enforcement agency and could advise him of the

Id. at 165.
Id. at 172.
165 Charles T. McConville, Muzzling the Mouthless Speaker: The Reform Community’s Prescription for “Corporate
Domination” in State Issue Campaigns, 35 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 245 (2006).
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ways to legally circumvent the law. This section will discuss each of the areas addressed
in the previous section, give suggestions for policy change, and draw conclusions about
what this means for democracy.
Corporate Donations and Unpaid Loans. As outlined in the previous section,
Grigsby and his various entities were able to contribute, through contributions and
unpaid loans, more than $450,000 to BRNext166 in an effort to ‚shape people’s thought
process.‛167
It is problematic when people of wealth, especially people who own corporations
that stand to benefit from close connections with elected officials, are allowed to put
large amounts of money into affecting an election. It is problematic in terms of opening
the door for political corruption and it is problematic in terms of political equality.
When the democracy shifts from the logic of ‚one person-one vote‛ to the market logic
of ‚may the highest bidder win,‛ the wealthy dominate and the poor are powerless.
Money becomes an exclusionary mechanism for eliminating poorer candidates and
muting the voices of poorer constituents.
How can this problem be solved? Is the answer more stringent financial
restrictions? Grigsby said the reality of politics is that there are currently no financial
restrictions: ‚When we hide from reality, we pretend that the situation is not what it
really is. We are deluded and misguided. I will guarantee right now that the money, if
you really want to, you can find out how to put it in<Most smart people try to do it
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This was confirmed by Grigsby in an interview.
Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in Baton Rouge, La. (May 14, 2007).
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completely legally. There are many loopholes.‛ He said he thinks efforts to safeguard
against money’s corrupting power of politics are futile: ‚money and politics is kind of
like trying to keep water in a straw basket. You can run around and put a piece of gum
on that leak and its going to come out somewhere else. Money is gonna come out in
politics<You are not going to get the influence of power and money out of politics. It’s
just not going to happen.‛
One solution provided on the federal level, however, has been a ban on corporate
contributions. Had this been in effect in Louisiana, it would have been more difficult for
Grigsby to put so much money into the election. In addition to contributions, corporate
loans should be prohibited and personal loans should be limited to contribution limits,
require greater disclosure of information, and be monitored to ensure they are paid
back.
Issue Advocacy. As stated previously, Grigsby was able to use the money
funneled into BRNext to purchase $311,963.61 worth of advertising and media time. The
ads, which avoided words of ‚express‛ advocacy, were not subject to the same
disclosure and contribution limits as coordinated expenditures.
This example illustrates that the vague differentiation between express and issue
advocacy is meaningless on the ground level. As in the case of BRNext, the current law
allows individuals and groups to spend unlimited amounts on pro- and anti- candidate
campaigns by avoiding key words. Disclosure requirements of the past no longer
provide sufficient accountability for today’s political activity. As Grigsby said, ‚The
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political process is evolving more rapidly than it used to. We are the age of information.
The influx of the speed of transmission of information is going to alter the process of
selection of our leadership. People of means are now understanding how to use the
power of their means in a more effective manner.‛168
It has been difficult to solve this problem without infringing on free speech of
groups that truly wish to address issues of concern. Some suggest addressing the issue
of where the money comes from, rather than scrutinizing the purpose of the message.
They suggest corporations should be barred from paying for issue advocacy with funds
from the corporate treasury. Instead, advocacy should be paid for with funds obtained
from voluntary contributions and kept separate from the organization’s general
treasury.169 Others argue that the answer is allowing more money into the system by
way of campaign contributions. They argue that ‚to reduce issue advertising as a way
to bring greater accountability to elections (i.e., making it easier for voters to know who
is paying for advertising), then perhaps existing restrictions on candidate contributions
should be removed.‛170 This suggestion, however, seems like a trade-off of one evil for
another.
More promising is West’s suggestion that would require issue ads to keep
sponsor identification visible for the duration of the advertisement. In addition, West
suggests ads listing of the people who primarily fund the ‚organization.‛ He says,

Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (May, 14 2007).
“New Realities, New Thinking”: Report of the Task Force on Campaign Finance Reform, 30 POLITICAL SCIENCE
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POLITICS 887 (2005) at 904.
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‚Hiding behind nebulous organization names like Citizens for Reform tells voters
nothing about the messenger. It matters who pays for ads and is behind the political
activity they urge.‛171
West takes this a step further and suggests that candidates should receive free
airtime in exchange for voluntarily accepting spending limits.172 Such free airtime has
shown promise in other countries. For example, public broadcasters in France and
Britain have an obligation to give free airtime to politicians during elections. In France,
the government allots each candidate and party an equal amount of free time on radio
and television.173 Similarly, in Britain, broadcasters make a joint offer of free airtime to
the principal political parties. In exchange for this time, ‚neither political parties nor
individual candidates are allowed to buy time for political advertising.‛174 Such free
airtime would reduce candidates’ dependence on private money and the use of pseudoissue advocacy to corrupt the process. Such a suggestion was made by the defeated
2003 McCain-Feingold bill which required all television and radio stations to air a
minimum of two hours a week of programming centered on the election, each election
cycle. It also required stations to provide a limited amount of free advertising time to
qualified candidates. Paul Taylor, former Washington Post reporter and founder of Free
TV for Straight Talk Coalition, ‚insists that free airtime is the most efficient and
practical way to reform how this nation finances its political campaigns, since paying
DARRELL M. WEST, CHECKBOOK DEMOCRACY: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS 186 (2000).
Id. at 174.
173 Patrick Basham, The Illiberal Reality of European-Style Campaign Reform, THE CATO INSTITUTE (March 13,
2002). Available at www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3417
174 Richard Somerset, Public Interest Obligations in Broadcasting: International Comparisons, 1
COMMUNICATIONS POLICY & PRACTICE (April 16, 1999).
171
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for airtime is what so inflates campaign cost.‛175 In addition, Taylor says it is a way to
‚wean the political system from so-called ‘soft money.’‛176
“Independent” Expenditures. As explained previously, BRNext was able to
avoid candidate contribution limits by registering as a non-connected PAC. Its
expenditures, therefore, were deemed ‚independent,‛ rather than coordinated
expenditures. Despite this ‚independent‛ label, the BRNext and Holden campaigns
made multiple payments to the same consulting firms.
Grigsby highlighted problematic characteristics of ‚independent‛ expenditures.
He pointed out that where previously PACs began under the idea that a consensus
would be formed among many people, in order to help make choices that were
beneficial to all, they now serve as fronts for independent expenditures. In the case of
BRNext, Grigsby said, ‚I was the consensus.‛ He also said in this new generation, ‚I
don’t need to spend the time going out and getting a big group consensus to come give
me money, because when you collect a group and lead them on a mission, it’s kind of
like being a pastor in a church, there’s always someone in the congregation that doesn’t
like the message<So, the fewer you have to please, the better the message is received.
So by not getting as many people into decision-making roles by way of their checkbook,
I am a lot freer.‛ 177

Joe Holley, The Solution: Free Airtime, COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW (May/June 1997). Available at
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This one-man consensus is not only problematic in terms of political equality, but
also in terms of disclosure when it is projected to the public as a grassroots movement
comprised of people from the community. BRNext’s first commercial said, ‚We are
BRNext; A group of people just like you; in search of answers; in search of
leadership.‛178 That is very different from the way Grigsby described BRNext. This
raises the question, had BRNext been subject to greater disclosure, revealing BRNext
(AKA Grigsby) to the public as it truly was, would the public have accepted its message
in the same way? Is it the intent of the democratic process to allow one individual to
use his money to ‚derail the election bids of candidates they don’t like?‛179
When questioned about the ethics of this, Grigsby echoed the sentiment put forth
by the Court in Montana Chamber of Commerce v. Argenbright180 when he said it is the
responsibility of the public to ‚discern between good and evil.‛ He blames uneducated
voters for falling prey to the promises of dishonest politicians: ‚Our problem with
democracy is that uneducated, uninformed, poor people have learned that they can
improve their lot in life by voting themselves a raise from the public treasury.‛181
If, according to Grigsby, the public is responsible to be more informed, how can
they do so when the information is not readily available? With the proliferation of these
new political actors and new routes for covert candidate spending, it is imperative that
disclosure requirements be broadened and strengthened. It is necessary for enforcement

Commercial: TV Spot 1- Introduction (Available at www.brnext.org)
Marsha Shuler, Third-parties’ Nasty Attacks Signal Trend, THE ADVOCATE, January 17, 2007.
180 Citing Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 661 (1990)) at 600. The Court said, it
“is up to the voters to determine whether they approve or disapprove of a corporation’s point of view.”
181 Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (May, 14 2007).
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179

53

agencies to identify these supposedly non-connected PACS, which are operating like
candidate committees, and hold them to the correct contribution and disclosure
requirements. Also, as West suggests, when broadcasting advertisements these groups
should be required to list major contributors. In this way, the public can identify these
groups as they are and choose whether to accept or reject their messages.
Oversight/Enforcement. Finally, the case of BRNext is an extreme example of the
failure of the oversight and enforcement agency to even keep up the appearance of a
functioning check on the system. While it is unlikely that Sexton is personally connected
with every PAC in Baton Rouge, his relationship to Grigsby sheds a light on the
system’s potential for corruption. Beyond the extracurricular activities of agency
members, lies the problem of agency protocol. This system of relying on lay people to
research and report violations in order to bring about investigation is totally ineffective.
Such nonperformance is detrimental to democracy. Without proper oversight and
enforcement, campaign finance laws are meaningless. The system requires scrupulous
enforcement. The oversight and enforcement agency must be structured in a way to
foster and oversee ethical behavior. In addition, the enforcement agency must not only
be empowered to levy severe penalties for the violation of the law, but must also actively
monitor campaign on goings.
In the case of BRNext, there are specific requirements that would have aided the
Ethics Board in overseeing financial activity. First, in addition to reporting expenditures
and contributions, had receipts with more information been submitted, identification of
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unethical behavior would have been more plausible. If the Ethics Board had been given
the authority to demand detailed financial records when necessary, it would have been
more probable that the agency would identify when money was handled in an illegal or
unethical manner. Also, had the rules regulating members of the oversight and
enforcement agency from managing political activities outside of the office been
enforced, then the Ethics Administrator’s relationship to Grigsby would not raise such
ethical questions.
In conclusion, to protect the integrity of democracy, Louisiana campaign finance
law requires reform. It requires, at the very least, a ban on corporate contributions and
expenditures, stronger contribution and loan limits, more detailed disclosure
requirements, and more active oversight and enforcement.
Protecting the Future of Democracy
BRNext is an example of how wealthy corporations and individuals dominate
the political discourse in America today, opening the door to ‚corruption and the
appearance of corruption.‛182 As Raskin said, this ‚involves a massive structural bias in
government favoring the parochial interests of corporate and personal wealth over the
interests of those citizens lacking access to such wealth.‛183 As outlined in Buckley this
corruption justifies the compelling governmental interest to further restrict campaign
finance. The argument that money is speech is insufficient reason to allow such

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
Jamin Raskin, Associate Professor of Law at The American University, Letter to the BOSTON REVIEW
(1993), http://bostonreview.net/BR18.3/forum.html. Commenting on Ellen Miller’s Money, Politics and
Democracy.
182
183

55

corruption to exist. While it is true that sometimes money is necessary to purchase
certain avenues for speech, such as television airtime, if speech can only be bought then
it is no longer free. When speech can only be bought, those without wealth are left
speechless. Democracy is not for sale. When it is put on the auction block of the
marketplace, as it is currently, it is bought up by the wealthy and powerful, resulting in
a superficial democracy where there is less speech, less diverse speech, corruption, and
apathy. Acknowledge more. Whereas on one side you have those who argue for a sort
of social Darwinism with the unfettered marketplace of ideas, the other side is for a
more diverse marketplace, idea of egalitarianism.

This problem is not going away. In a very recent ruling, in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to
Life (WRTL),184 the U. S. Supreme Court struck down certain applications of the BCRA’s
restriction on issue advocacy communications, an attempt to prohibit corporations from
purchasing such communications with general (non-PAC) funds. In his dissent, Justice
Souter argued:

Devoting concentrations of money in self-interested hands to the support of
political campaigning therefore threatens the capacity of this democracy to
represent its constituents and the confidence of its citizens in their capacity to
govern themselves. These are the elements summed up in the notion of
political integrity, giving it a value second to none in a free society.

He continued by writing that campaign finance reform evidences that political
corruption is not limited to quid-pro quo political corruption, and that political integrity is

184

FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, No. 06-969, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195 aff’d, U.S. 2007.
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most threatened by the ‚pervasive distortion of electoral institutions by concentrated
wealth, on the special access and guaranteed favor that sap the representative integrity of
American government and defy public confidence in its institutions.‛185
Whether or not the aforementioned policy changes would resolve these problems
resulting in a more ethical and level political playing field is up for debate. There are those
that believe like Justices John Paul Stevens and Sandra Day O’Conner, ‚Money, like water,
will always find an outlet.‛186 Grigsby echoed Stevens and O’Conner’s sentiment when he
said, ‚‚Politics and money are just like water and air. You can’t keep water and air out of
things. If there are little holes or open areas, they’ll find out where that little opening is. The
mother milk of politics is money.‛187 West argues that ‚*u+ntil the courts recognize the need
to balance freedom of expression with the equally important principles of openness,
fairness, and equitable electoral competitions, there can be no meaningful reform.‛188
If something is not done soon, however, cases such as BRNext will become
commonplace. Long before BRNext, Grigsby said he started in parish politics. Now he
intends to go statewide. He said, ‚I’ve been involved in 70 legislative races. Through
various PACs<I get PACs for everything<‛ He said he began affecting elections in 1988
when he helped oust Pat Screen as mayor. Since then, he said he used his PAC Business
Congress of Louisiana to try to affect the 2004 Governor’s race.
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Id. in dissenting opinion.
McConnell v. Federal Election Com’n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003). In majority opinion.
187 Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (May, 14 2007).
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186

57

As of this study, Grigsby and BRNext are under investigation by the Ethics Board
for supposed collusion in the 2006 Senate race. In an interview Grigsby said, ‚I recruited
Dr. Bill Cassidy to run for senate. So, I was gonna give him a little bit of help.‛ Grigsby said
he ‚whacked‛ Cassidy’s opponent, William Daniels, with $20,000 worth of mailouts
publicizing his divorce.189 In December 2006 Daniels filed a complaint with the Ethics Board
alleging that Cassidy and BRNext illegally colluded in violation of state campaign laws.
Despite Grigsby’s comment that he ‚recruited‛ Cassidy and that he ‚was gonna give him a
little bit of help,‛ Cassidy denied any connection with the BRNext mailouts.190 Once this
investigation is resolved, Grigsby said he would like to affect state-wide politics with his
new PAC LANext.
In 2007, Grigsby took a full-page advertisement out in The Advocate newspaper
soliciting candidates to run against state Representative Bodi White. In an interview with
The Advocate Grigsby said he was angry with White for a pro-union vote on plumbing
legislation. White argued that he was voting for his constituency.191 Grigsby said he was
just putting the ‚first spotlight on the first cockroach.‛192 In another interview, when asked
about safeguarding democracy against the corrupting-power of money, Grigsby said, ‚I’m
gonna tell you, third parties are here. You can leverage a dollar beyond belief. Can it be
used viciously and mean-spiritedly? Yes! It will be! I’m not policeman of the world.‛193

Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in BatonRouge, La. (April, 25 2007).
Marsha Shuler, Candidate Daniel Files Ethics Complaint on Fliers, THE ADVOCATE, December 7, 2006.
191 BR Contractor Prepares for Race, THE ADVOCATE, May 27, 2007.
192 Seth Fox, Grigsby Attacks Rep. Bodi White in Ad, THE BATON ROUGE BUSINESS REPORT, May 21, 2007.
193 Interview with Lane Grigsby, founder, BRNext, in Baton Rouge, La. (May, 14 2007).
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While there will always be those like Grigsby that try to exploit or even violate the
system, however, it is the job of the government to attempt to protect and ensure the right
to open, fair, ethical, and equitable elections. It is imperative that laws protect against ‚the
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated
with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s
support for the corporation’s political ideas.‛194 Because politics, elections, and campaign
financing are forever changing, the laws must continue to adapt to include new actors and
financial avenues and ensure that those without money still have a voice. BRNext is
evidence that the laws of the past are ineffective in today’s campaign finance environment.
The government should and must protect elections from wealthy hijackers. Regulation
alone, though, is not a panacea. To have an open, fair, ethical, and equitable democracy
requires an electorate that is committed to such an ideal and will thus demand that
campaign finance laws are not just passed by legislatures, but enforced by accountable
oversight bodies.

194

Id. at 654, 659-60.

59

REFERENCES

Adamany, D. W., & Agree, G. E. (1975). Political Money: A Strategy for Campaign
Financing in America. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.
Alford, J. (2006, October 18). The Character Assassin. The Independent Weekly.
Ambrosius, M. M. (1989). The Role of Occupational Interest Groups in State Economic
Development Policy-Making. Western Political Quarterly, 42, 53-68.
Ball, J. R. (2004, November 9). Why Simpson Lost. The Greater Baton Rouge Business
Report.
Barrow, B. (2007, May 16). Limits on Ethics Board Attorney Approved. The Times
Picayune.
Basham, P. (2002, March 13). The Illiberal Reality of European-Style Campaign Reform.
From The Cato Institute. Available at www.cato.org/pub_display.
php?pub_id=3417
BeVier, L. R. (1985, July). Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment
and Campaign Finance Reform. California Law Review, 69, 1045-1090.
BR Contractor Prepares for Race (2007, May 27). The Advocate.
Brown, J. (2003, December 17). The Feds Continue to Stick it to Us, Available at Politics
La.com.
Buckley, W. F., Jr. (1981, May 15). About Nikpak. National Review.
Dyer, S. (2004, October 4). Holden’s Win Aided by Daniel. The Advocate.
Dyer, S. (2004, September 16). Two Members of BRNext Resign Over Campaign ‚Tone.‛
The Advocate.
Dyer, S. (2004, September 20). Clean Campaign Vowed BRNext to Continue Ad Plan.
The Advocate.
Fiss, O. M. (1996). The Irony of Free Speech. Boston: Harvard.
Fling, K. J. (1979). The State as Laboratories of Reform. In H. E. Alexander (Ed.), Political
Finance. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
60

Foley, E. (1994). Equal-Dollars-per-Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign
Finance. Columbia Law Review, 94(1), 1204-1257.
Fox, S. (2007, May 21). Grigsby Attacks Rep. Bodi White in Ad. The Baton Rouge Business
Report.
Glantz, S. A., Abramowitz, A. I., & Burkart, M. P. (1976). Election Outcomes: Whose
Money Matters?. Journal of Politics, 38(4), 1033-1038.
Grant, J. T., & Rudolph, T. J. (2003). Value Conflict, Group Affect, and the Issue of
Campaign Finance. American Journal of Political Science, 47(3), 453- 469.
Gray, V., & Lowery, D. (1996). The Political Ecology of Interest Representation:
Lobbying Communities in the American States. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press.
Hamilton, L. (2005, October 3). The Money Chase. Retrieved from The Center on
Congress at Indiana University at http://congress.indiana.edu/radio
commentaries/the money chase.php.
Hasen, R. L. (1996). Clipping Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/Public Choice
Defense of Campaign Finance Vouchers. California Law Review, 84(7), 1-60.
Hasen, R. L. (1999). Campaign Finance Laws and the Rupert Murdoch Problem. Texas
Law Review, 77(7), 1627-1666.
Herbenar, R. J., & Thomas, C. S. (1992). Interest Group Politics in the Southern States.
Tuscaloosa, AZ: University of Alabama Press.
Hogan, R. E. (2005) State Campaign Finance Laws and Interest Group Electioneering
Activities. Journal of Politics, 67, 887-906.
Holley, J. (1997, May/June). The Solution: Free Airtime. Columbia Journalism Review.
Available at http://backissues.cjrarchives.org/year/97/3/freeair.asp.

House Chooses Two New Ethics Board Members, (2007). ASSOCIATED PRESS, Available
online at www.theadvocate.com.
Huckshorn, R. J. (1985). Who Gave it? Who Got It?: The Enforcement of Campaign
Finance Laws in the States. Journal of Politics, 47(3), 773-789.
61

Hunter, K. G., Wilson, L. A., & Brunk, G. (1991). Societal Complexity and Interest Group
Lobbying in the American States. Journal of Politics, 53(2), 488-503.
Jacobson, G. C. (1980). Money in Congressional Elections. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Jones, R. (1981). State Public Campaign Finance: Implications for Partisan Politics.
American Journal Of Political Science, 25(2), 342-360.
Jones, R. S. (1984). Financing State Elections, in M. Malbin (Ed.), Money and Politics in the
United States (pp. 172-213). Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.
Key, V. O., Jr. (1949). Southern Politics, in State and Nation. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
LaForge, A. S. (1996). The Toothless Tiger-Structural, Political and Legal Barriers to
Effective FEC Enforcement. The American University Administrative Law Journal, 10
(351).
MacPherson, M. (1980, August 10). The New Right Brigade. Washington Post.
Malbin, M. J. (1985). You Get What You Pay For, but Is That What You Want?, in G.
Grassmuch (Ed.), Before Nomination: Our Primary Problems (pp. 72-86).
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.
Mankinson, L. (1990). Open Secrets: The Dollar Power of PACs in Congress. Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
McConnell, M. (2001, April 1). In Defense of Soft Money. New York Times.
McConville, C. T. (2006). Muzzling the Mouthless Speaker: The Reform Community’s
Prescription for ‚Corporate Domination‛ in State Issue Campaigns. Capital
University Law Review, 35(1), 245-280.
Murphy, L. & Gora, J. (2001, March 29). Congressional Record S3135.
“New Realities, New Thinking”: Report of the Task Force on Campaign Finance Reform, 30
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND POLITICS, 30(3), 487-489 (1997).
Neuborne, B. (1999). Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment.
Northwestern University Law Review, 93(6), 1055-1073.

62

Neuborne, B. (1999). Is Money Different? Texas Law Review, 77(7), 1609-1625.
Nice, D. C. (1984). Political Equality and Campaign Finance in the American States.
Social Science Quarterly, 65, 1104-1111.
Viveca, N., & Cobb, J. (1987). The Kindness of Strangers. Common Cause Magazine, 13(5),
32-37.
Parent, W. (2004). Inside the Carnival: Unmasking Louisiana Politics. Baton Rouge, LA:
Louisiana State University Press.
Pleas by Insurance Officials. (1990, May 30). N.Y. Times.
Raskin, J., & Bonifaz, J. (1993). Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary. Yale Law and
Policy Review, 11, 287-297.
Raskin, J. (1993). Letter to the Boston Review. Available at http://bostonreview.
net/BR18.3/forum.html.
Rosenthal, A. (2001). The Third House: Lobbyists and Lobbying in the States. Washington,
D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.
Rosenthal, A. J. (2004). 527 Regulation and the Trickle-Down Effect. New York University
Journal of Legislation and Public Policy, 18(55), 179-190.
Sabato, L. J. (1989). Paying for Elections. New York: Priority Press Publications.
Shuler, M. (2006, December 7). Candidate Daniel Files Ethics Complaint on Fliers. The
Advocate.
Shuler, M. (2007, January 17). Third-parties’ Nasty Attacks Signal Trend. The Advocate.
Smith, B. A. (1997). Money Talks: Speech, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance.
Georgetown Law Journal, 86(1), 45-100.
Smith, B. A. (1998). Soft Money, Hard Realities: The Constitutional Prohibition of a Soft
Money Ban. Journal of Legislation, 179(2), 179-200.
Smith, B. A. (1999). The Sirens’ Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First
Amendment. Journal of Law and Policy, 6(1), 1-44.
Smith, B. A. (2001). Unfree Speech: The Folly of Campaign Finance Reform. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
63

Somerset, R. (1999, April 16). Public Interest Obligations in Broadcasting: International
Comparisons. Communications Policy & Practice, 1.
Stark, A. (1993, April). Strange Bedfellows: Two Paradoxes in Constitutional Discourse
Over Corporate and Individual Political Activity. Cardoza Law Review, 14, 13431390.
Sunstein, C. R. (1994). Political Equality and Unintended Consequences. Columbia Law
Review, 94(4), 1390-1414.
Taylor, P. (1997, April 28). Clean up Politics with Free Airtime for Ads. Advertisng Age,
68(30), 2-5.
Wertheimer, F., & Manes, S. (1994). Campaign Finance Reform: A Key to Restoring the
Health of Our Democracy. Columbia Law Review, 94(4), 1126-1159.
West, D. M. (2000). Checkbook Democracy: How Money Corrupts Political Campaigns.
Boston: Northeastern University Press.

64

VITA

Casey Elizabeth Rayborn is a native of Baton Rouge, Louisiana. She received her
Bachelor of Arts in mass communication with the honor of Summa Cum Laude from the
Manship School of Mass Communication at Louisiana State University in 2003. As an
undergraduate, she served as a production assistant for TigerTV. After receiving her
Bachelor’s degree she served as Public Information Director and Multimedia Archive
Director for the Louisiana Secretary of State’s office for two and half years. She left the
Secretary of State’s office to pursue her Master’s and currently an independent political
consultant for several campaigns, state and local.
Casey plans to continue working in politics and pursue a career in academia. Her
research interests include media law, media ethics, and political communication. This
study developed from a paper about communication strategy in Dr. Laura Lindsay’s
class.

65

